ssh-mcp MCP Server
tufantunc/ssh-mcp
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MCP server exposing SSH control for Linux servers via Model Context Protocol.
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tufantunc/ssh-mcp is a TypeScript MCP server licensed under MIT. MCP server exposing SSH control for Linux servers via Model Context Protocol.
Ranked #3174 out of 24846 indexed tools.
Ecosystem
TypeScript MIT
Score Breakdown
Stars 15% 802
802 stars → growing community
Freshness 25% 17d ago
Last commit 17d ago → recently updated
Issue Health 25% 92%
36/39 issues closed → responsive maintainer
Contributors 10% 8
8 contributors → small team
Dependents 25% 2
2 dependents → few downstream users
npm Downloads N/A
PyPI Downloads N/A
Forks 128
Description Good
License MIT
Weights: Freshness 20% · Issue Health 20% · Dependents 22% · Stars 10% · Contributors 8% · How we score →
How to Improve
Description low impact
Matched Queries
From the README
# SSH MCP Server v2 **SSH MCP Server** is a security-first Model Context Protocol server that gives LLM agents controlled SSH access to remote hosts — with command classification, policy-based authorization, human-in-the-loop approval, and full audit logging. > **The risk this server exists to manage.** Giving an LLM shell access on a remote host puts private data, untrusted input and network egress in one place — Simon Willison's ["lethal trifecta"](https://simonwillison.net/2025/Jun/16/the-lethal-trifecta/). Prompt injection has no general fix, so ssh-mcp assumes any command may be attacker-influenced: it classifies before executing, authorizes against a role × host-group matrix, gates destructive work behind approval, and records the decision either way. That narrows the blast radius; it does not remove the risk. Two things stay yours: **never point it at a root account**, and **never set `auto` approval on a production profile**. [SECURITY.md](./SECURITY.md) has the full threat mRead full README on GitHub →
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